Last week, former Commissioner of Competition and Fasken Senior Business Advisor John Pecman published a highly topical article in the Financial Post outlining why knee-jerk antitrust reform may worsen inflation. Yesterday morning, the Minister of Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, Francois-Philippe Champagne, announced that the Government of Canada will engage in a broad review of the Competition Act (the “Act”) with a view to promoting dynamic and fair markets. This announcement comes in response to growing calls for reform to Canada’s competition laws to account for the market power of large companies, particularly in the digital space. Reform proposals range from practical and constructive, to bold and potentially harmful.

In his article in the Financial Post, John explains that many of the proposed reform proposals would bring back outdated views about big business and may well result in reduced economic efficiency and harm to consumers. Further, he discusses why one particular reform proposal would be inadvisable – a ban on self-preferencing. John explains that a ban on self-preferencing either generally, or specifically by large digital platforms, may cause less competition, less innovation, and higher prices. He notes that the Act already permits competition regulators to challenge and stop practices such as self-preferencing by entities with market power if they are likely to result in a substantial lessening or prevention of competition. Until the current laws are shown to be inadequate, John suggests it is premature to seek legislative changes.

Since the Supreme Court of Canada’s 2013 trilogy of decisions in Pro-SysSun-Rype and Infineon, and its 2019 decision in Godfrey, plaintiffs have had considerable success certifying private antitrust/competition class actions in Canada.  It is thus noteworthy that a number of recent decisions suggest a growing judicial willingness to limit or dismiss proposed competition class actions at the certification stage or before certification through preliminary motions.

Continue Reading Competition Class Actions in Canada: Takeaways from 2021 and Trends for 2022

Competition, marketing and foreign investment law saw a number of changes in the past year. Many of these changes were in response to the continuing COVID-19 pandemic, which has significantly changed the way Canadians, businesses and government agencies operate. Despite the pandemic, the Competition Bureau (the “Bureau”) has actively continued its enforcement activity and provided a number of guidance documents to help businesses stay onside the Competition Act (the “Act”). Similarly, Canada’s Investment Review Division (“IRD”) of Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada (“ISED”) has also responded to the challenges resulting from the pandemic.

Continue Reading Fasken’s Forecast for 2022 and Beyond: 2021’s Top 10 Trends in Canadian Competition, Marketing & Foreign Investment Law and what Businesses should expect in 2022

Under the Investment Canada Act (the “ICA”), the direct acquisition of control of a Canadian business by a non-Canadian may be subject to a pre-closing review and approval process (a “Net Benefit Review”) if a specified monetary threshold is exceeded. When officially published in the February Canada Gazette, the following thresholds for Net Benefit Reviews will be effective from January 1, 2022:

Continue Reading Investment Canada Act: New Monetary Thresholds for 2022

Business people in South Africa who do business by responding to tenders do so well aware that empowerment credentials assist in standing a good chance of winning. Companies seeking to win a tender over their rivals will therefore often put in tenders in their own name as well as with an empowerment partner. This carries very real competition risks.

A number of years ago, textile manufacturers Berg River Textiles and Da Gama Textiles were both competing for tenders to supply uniforms to various government departments. In each instance they partnered with black empowerment entities, evidently in the hope that this would be of assistance in winning the tenders. Both fell foul of the competition law provisions regarding collusive tendering.

Continue Reading Tendering with an Empowerment Partner? Be Wary of the Collusion Risk

On November 4, 2021, Justine Reisler and Robin Spillette attended the Global Competition Review’s annual Women in Antitrust conference in Washington, D.C. The event featured an incredible lineup of female lawyers and economists on panels addressing some of the most cutting-edge topics in antitrust today, namely: (i) assessing deal risk in a time of changing standards, (ii) approaches being taken by competition agencies to address global concerns about Big Tech, (iii) sustainable economic development, and (iv) innovation in the pharmaceutical sector.

Continue Reading Key Themes from the Global Competition Review’s Annual Women in Antitrust Conference

Surprisingly, the economy did not take centre stage in the recent federal government election. Rather, the limelight was on the government’s pandemic performance and the growing government intervention in all aspects of our lives.  Canadians, it seems, were not ready to turn the channel from their binge watching of the governments’ pandemic caretaking.  However, as the ratings begin to fall for COVID-19 programming, the new government and the public will likely soon turn their attention to more traditional table steaks, such as economic policy execution, particularly if inflation continues to rise, ravaging the disposable income of Canadians, and store shelves remain empty.  On the list of outstanding economic marketplace framework policy upgrades from the last parliamentary session are telecommunications and broadcasting (Bill C-10) and privacy (Bill C-11) reforms.  In the last session, parliament also took a small step towards competition policy modernization via the Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology hearings which informed a report recommending modest amendments to the Competition Act.  The previous substantive refinement to Canada’s competition law took place in 2009 following an in-depth study and report by the Competition Policy Review Panel which predated the major digital transformation of the economy. Last week, in a speech to the Canadian Bar Association’s competition law fall conference, the Commissioner of Competition made an impassioned plea for a comprehensive review of the Competition Act to modernize it for today’s reality and keep up with other jurisdictions.

Continue Reading Post-Election Priorities – Will a Competition Policy Review make the Cut?

It is widely recognized and accepted that vertical mergers are generally pro-competitive or benign. For example, the Competition Bureau (the “Bureau”) has stated in its Merger Enforcement Guidelines (the “MEGs”) that vertical mergers “may not entail the loss of competition between the merging firms in a relevant market” and “frequently create significant efficiencies”, such as efficiencies related to quality improvements, increased innovation, the creation of maverick firms and the elimination of double-marginalization (or double markups in price by cutting out the middle-person in a supply chain). That being said, as is evident from the Bureau’s recent review of the proposed joint venture between Federated Co-operatives Limited (“FCL”) and Blair’s Family of Companies (“Blair’s”) (the “Proposed Transaction”), vertical mergers can raise competition concerns in some circumstances, such as where they result in a competing firm being foreclosed from the market.

What Are Vertical Mergers?

A horizontal merger is a merger between firms that supply competing products. By contrast, vertical mergers involve firms that produce products at different levels of a supply chain (e.g., a merger between a supplier and a customer). Vertical mergers do not reduce competition on its face since there is no competition between the goods or services of the merging firms.

The Proposed Transaction

Each of FCL and Blair’s is involved in the agricultural business in Western Canada. In particular, FCL operates a wholesaling, manufacturing, marketing and administrative co-operative owned by more than 160 independent retail co-operatives ( the “Local-Co-ops”), which in turn own and operate ag-retailers in communities throughout Western Canada. Blair’s is a full service ag-retailer that, among other things, operates seven ag-retail locations in Saskatchewan. These retail locations supply growers with various crop inputs, such as fertilizer, crop protection products, seeds, animal nutrition products and related services (e.g., agronomy services).

On February 3, 2021, FCL and Blair’s announced that they had agreed to enter a joint venture. The joint venture would be majority owned by FCL and it would acquire Blair’s  seven ag-retail locations.

Review of the Proposed Transaction

Following its review, the Bureau concluded that the Proposed Transaction would likely substantially lessen competition in the retailing of crop inputs in Lipton, Saskatchewan, resulting in higher prices and lower service quality for local growers. In order to address these concerns, FCL and Blair’s entered into a consent agreement with the Commissioner of Competition (the “Commissioner”), pursuant to which they agreed to sell Blair’s retail location in Lipton, along with two nearby anhydrous ammonia facilities.

Significantly, as discussed in more detail in the Position Statement issued by the Bureau, the alleged anti-competitive effects of concern arose from the vertical relationship between the parties: with FCL acting as a wholesale supplier to the Local Co-op ag-retailers which compete with Blair’s ag-retail business. In particular, the Bureau examined whether the Proposed Transaction would create incentives for both FCL’s Local Co-Ops and Blair’s retail locations to raise prices or lower quality in the supply of crop inputs in the any relevant geographic area.

The Bureau considered both qualitative and quantitative evidence as part of its investigation, and notably put a lot of weight on the parties own documents with respect to its analysis of the vertical relationship between the parties and the likely competitive effects of the Proposed Transaction.

Approach to Vertical Mergers

Vertical mergers may harm competition if the merged firm is able to limit or eliminate rival firms’ access to inputs or markets, thereby reducing or eliminating rival firms’ ability or incentive to compete. The ability to affect rivals in this manner is referred to as “foreclosure”. As discussed in more detail in the MEGs, foreclosure may be partial or complete and may involve inputs or customers.

Specifically, in the case of vertical mergers, the Bureau considers four main categories of foreclosure:

  • total input foreclosure, which occurs when the merged firm refuses to supply an input to rival manufacturers that compete with it in the downstream market;
  • partial input foreclosure, which occurs when the merged firm increases the price it charges to supply an input to rival manufacturers that compete with it in the downstream market;
  • total customer foreclosure, which occurs when the merged firm refuses to purchase inputs from an upstream rival; and
  • partial customer foreclosure, which occurs when the merged firm is a distributor and can disadvantage upstream rivals in the distribution/resale of their products.

When examining the likely foreclosure effects of a vertical merger, the Bureau considers three inter‑related questions, namely (1) whether the merged firm has the ability to harm rivals; (2) whether the merged firm has the incentive (i.e., whether it is profitable) to do so; and (3) whether the merged firm’s actions would be sufficient to prevent or lessen competition substantially.

The Bureau also considers whether a vertical merger could increase the likelihood of coordinated interaction among firms, either at the upstream or downstream level. Vertical integration can facilitate coordinated behaviour by firms in the upstream market by making it easier to monitor the prices rivals charge upstream and control the competition in the market. On the other hand, vertical mergers can also facilitate coordinated behaviour by firms in a downstream market by increasing transparency (e.g., by enabling firms to observe increased purchases of inputs) or by providing additional ways to discourage or punish deviations (e.g., by limiting the supply of inputs).

While not set out explicitly in the Position Statement, in assessing whether the Proposed Transaction would create incentives for FCL and Blair’s retail locations to raise prices or lower quality in the supply of crop inputs in the Lipton area, both input foreclosure and as well as downstream coordinated effects theories of harm may have been considered by the Bureau.


This recent transaction highlights the Bureau’s continued focus on potentially anti-competitive vertical mergers – a trend that is also apparent in other jurisdictions around the world, including the United States. As such, the nature and extent of any existing or potential vertical relationships between the merging parties continues to be an important consideration in any competition-related risk assessment.

Separately, it is worth noting that the parties were able to reach a settlement prior to full compliance with the Supplementary Information Request that had been issued by the Commissioner. While in our experience this is rare, it provides a helpful precedent that merging parties will be able to point to in the future.

If you have questions about the merger provisions in the Competition Act, you can reach out to any member of Fasken’s Competition, Marketing & Foreign Investment group. Our group has significant experience advising clients on all aspects of Canadian competition law.

The information and guidance provided in this blog post does not constitute legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If legal advice is required, please contact a member Fasken’s Competition, Marketing & Foreign Investment group.




On September 20, 2021, Canadians will head to the polls to elect a new House of Commons. All of Canada’s major political parties have released political platforms which outline their plans to revise and, at least in their view, improve Canadian competition law and policy. Depending on which party is ultimately elected (and whether they win a majority), competition law in Canada may see some significant changes, including more serious penalties for existing offences and reviewable practices, as well as a few new ones.

Continue Reading How will the outcome of the 2021 Federal Election impact Competition Law in Canada?

On August 16, 2021, the Competition Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) dismissed the Commissioner of Competition’s (the “Commissioner”) request for interim relief in connection with the recently-completed merger of SECURE Energy Services Inc. (“Secure”) and Tervita Corporation (“Tevita”) (the “Transaction”). In summary, in its decision made public on August 23, 2021, the Tribunal found that the Commissioner had failed to provide clear and non-speculative evidence quantifying the harm likely to arise from the Transaction, as required by the “balance of convenience” aspect of the applicable test.


On March 9, 2021, Secure and Tervita announced a transaction to combine their respective midstream infrastructure and environmental solutions businesses.

On June 29, 2021, the Commissioner filed a Notice of Application pursuant to section 92 of the Competition Act (the “Act”) alleging that the Transaction would result in a substantial prevention or lessening of competition in various markets in British Columbia (the “Section 92 Application”).

At the same time he filed the Section 92 Application, the Commissioner also filed a Notice of Application for Interim Order pursuant to section 104 of Act for an order preventing the merging parties from proceeding with the Transaction until the Section 92 Application is finally disposed of (the “Section 104 Application”).

Finally, because the applicable waiting period had expired and the merging parties had advised the Commissioner that they intended to close the Transaction shortly after midnight on July 2, 2021, the Commissioner requested an interim order preventing the parties from closing the Transaction until the Section 104 Application was heard. As discussed in a prior blog post, the Commissioner’s application for what would have amounted to “interim interim” relief was denied by both the Tribunal and the Federal Court of Appeal on the basis that the Tribunal does not have the jurisdiction to issue such relief, with the result that the Transaction closed as planned.

The Section 104 Application was heard by the Tribunal on August 4, 2021. During this hearing, the Commissioner verbally amended the Section 104 Application to request an order requiring certain identified facilities formerly owned by Tervita to be “held separately and operated independently” from Secure. It is unclear from the public record why the Commissioner’s amended relief was limited to select facilities when the Section 92 Application sought a full block of the Transaction, which seems more consistent with a full hold separate of the acquired business.

Test for Section 104 Order

In exercising its discretion to issue an interim order under section 104 of the Act, the Tribunal is directed to consider “the principles ordinarily considered by superior courts when granting interlocutory or injunctive relief”. In this regard, the Tribunal has consistently applied the tripartite test for injunctive relief set out by the Supreme Court of Canada (the “SCC”) in RJR-MacDonald. Accordingly, the Tribunal may issue an interim order under this provision if the Commissioner proves the following on a balance of probabilities: (a) there is a serious issue to be tried; (b) irreparable harm would ensue if an interim order is not granted; and (c) the balance of  convenience favours granting the interim order.

Competition Tribunal Decision

As acknowledged by the Tribunal, the Commissioner’s application raised “important issues with respect to each of the three parts of the tripartite test that have not previously been addressed” in the context of a fully contested proceeding. Several of these issues are summarized below.

(a)       The Applicable Test

Because the Transaction had closed and certain steps had already been taken to integrate the parties’ businesses, Secure submitted that the tripartite test set out in RJR-MacDonald did not apply. Rather, Secure argued that the Tribunal should apply the more stringent test applicable to requests for mandatory or positive relief, which, consistent with the SCC’s decision in Canadian Broadcasting Corp., would require the Commissioner to demonstrate a “strong prima facie case” rather than a “serious issue to be tried”.

While the Tribunal agreed that this stricter test would ordinarily apply to situations where the Commissioner seeks relief under section 104 of the Act that is largely mandatory in nature, it did not consider it appropriate to do so “in the very particular circumstances of this case”.

(b)       Serious Issue to be Tried

Consistent with prior jurisprudence, the Tribunal acknowledged that the threshold to determine whether there is a serious issue to be tried is a low one. In brief, the Tribunal must simply be satisfied that the issues raised are neither vexatious nor frivolous. Not surprisingly, the Tribunal quickly found that the Commissioner had met this standard, as the Section 104 Application raised issues with respect to, among other things, relevant market definition, the effectiveness of remaining competition and the application of the efficiencies defence.

(c)        Irreparable Harm

The Commissioner’s submissions with respect to harm focused on the harm that is currently occurring (and would continue to occur) pending the determination of the Section 92 Application, and notably did not include evidence suggesting that, in the absence of injunctive relief, there would not be an effective remedy available to restore competition to the requisite level. In contrast, Secure argued that the interim effects on competition are not relevant as a matter of law in an application under section 104.

The Tribunal disagreed with Secure, finding that adverse interim price and non-price effects on customers can constitute irreparable harm for the purposes of an application under section 104 of the Act. The Tribunal noted that this finding is consistent with both its prior decision in Parkland (which stated that such harm was “irreparable” as, among other things, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to award damages under the merger provisions of the Act) and the scheme of the Act (including the purpose clause and sections 92, 100, 104 and 123).

Secure also argued that, even if interim effects were to be included in the analysis, there would be no irreparable harm as Secure’s internal “Integration Guidance” to its management team stated that there were to be no price increases to customers. The Tribunal rejected this argument, stating that it “cannot rely on a merged entity to benevolently refrain from exercising any increased market power that results from a merger” as it is “the ability to exercise increased market power that must be addressed in applications under section 104 (and indeed 92)”.

Ultimately, the Tribunal found that the Commissioner had provided clear and non-speculative evidence from which it could be reasonably and logically inferred, on a balance of probabilities, that the alleged irreparable harm would occur. In reaching this conclusion, the Tribunal was mindful that the onus of demonstrating irreparable harm to the public interest is less for a public authority such as the Commissioner than it is for a private applicant.

(d)       Balance of Convenience

This stage of the assessment requires the Tribunal to consider “which of the two parties will suffer the greater harm from the granting or refusal of an interlocutory injunction, pending a decision on the merits”. In this regard, while the Tribunal found that Secure had “provided clear and non-speculative evidence regarding the general extent of the harm that it will suffer if the relief requested by the Commissioner is granted”, the Commissioner failed to quantify the harm likely to arise from the Transaction. This ultimately proved to be fatal to Commissioner’s Section 104 Application.

Significantly, the Tribunal stated as follows:

… in a merger case where the respondent provides clear and non-speculative evidence of the extent of harm that it would suffer if the relief sought by the Commissioner is granted, the Commissioner must provide at least some “rough” or initial sense of the irreparable harm he alleges would result if that relief is not granted.

Moreover, the Tribunal stated that, particularly in the case where, as here, the Bureau has extensive information from previous cases upon which he can build, these “rough estimates” should be supported by: (i) the range of price effects that are likely to result from the merger; (ii) a range of plausible elasticities; (iii) a “ballpark” estimate of the deadweight loss; and (iv), where applicable, a basic sense of the extent to which non-price effects are likely to result from the merger. The Tribunal emphasized that this requirement “minimizes the degree of subjective judgment necessary in the analysis and enables the Tribunal to make the most objective assessment possible in the circumstances”. Where the Commissioner requires more time to prepare such rough estimates, the Tribunal noted that interim relief under section 100 of the Act may be available.


The Tribunal’s decision has a number of implications for merging parties going forward, including the following:

  • Importance of Efficiencies: Efficiencies have an important role to play under both sections 96 and 104 of the Act. Parties to efficiency-motivated mergers would be well advised to consider and prioritize the assessment and quantification of efficiencies at an early stage if they anticipate a lengthy review by the Competition Bureau.
  • Timing for Consideration of Efficiencies: As discussed in more detail in a prior blog post, the Competition Bureau’s Model Timing Agreement for Merger Reviews involving Efficiencies includes a relatively lengthy timeline for the Bureau to assess efficiencies claims. The Tribunal’s decision raises important questions regarding the utility of this timing agreement.
  • Increased Reliance of Section 100: Given the need for the Commissioner to quantify harm at an earlier stage – including in the context of a section 104 application – the Commissioner’s historic reluctance to bring section 100 applications may change. Specifically, the Commissioner may opt to file an application under section 100, followed very shortly thereafter by applications under sections 92 and 104 of the Act.
  • Less Reliance on Interim Relief: Alternatively, given the Commissioner’s heightened evidentiary burden for interim relief, the Commissioner may see fit to concentrate his efforts on the main section 92 application, relying on his jurisdiction to challenge a transaction up to one year post-closing.

Separately, although the Commissioner has previously acknowledged that “the efficiencies defence is a reality in Canadian competition law”, he has also suggested that it may be time to amend the Act to remove this uniquely Canadian defence. It is possible that the Commissioner will use this decision as further supporting his push for amendments to the Act.

If you have questions about the merger provisions in the Competition Act, you can reach out to any member of Fasken’s Competition, Marketing & Foreign Investment group. Our group has significant experience advising clients on all aspects of Canadian competition law.

The information and guidance provided in this blog post does not constitute legal advice and should not be relied on as such. If legal advice is required, please contact a member Fasken’s Competition, Marketing & Foreign Investment group.