It is widely recognized and accepted that vertical mergers are generally pro-competitive or benign. For example, the Competition Bureau (the “Bureau”) has stated in its Merger Enforcement Guidelines (the “MEGs”) that vertical mergers “may not entail the loss of competition between the merging firms in a relevant market” and “frequently create
On September 20, 2021, Canadians will head to the polls to elect a new House of Commons. All of Canada’s major political parties have released political platforms which outline their plans to revise and, at least in their view, improve Canadian competition law and policy. Depending on which party is ultimately elected (and whether they win a majority), competition law in Canada may see some significant changes, including more serious penalties for existing offences and reviewable practices, as well as a few new ones.
Continue Reading How will the outcome of the 2021 Federal Election impact Competition Law in Canada?
On August 16, 2021, the Competition Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) dismissed the Commissioner of Competition’s (the “Commissioner”) request for interim relief in connection with the recently-completed merger of SECURE Energy Services Inc. (“Secure”) and Tervita Corporation (“Tevita”) (the “Transaction”). In summary, in its decision made public
On July 1, 2021, the Competition Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) ruled that it does not have the power to issue “interim, interim orders” in the context of a proposed merger of two companies in the midstream infrastructure and environmental solutions space. Rather, the Tribunal found that, in the case of mergers, interim relief is limited to that expressly provided for by sections 100 and 104 of the Competition Act (the “Act”).
Continue Reading Competition Tribunal Dismisses Request for Interim, Interim Order
In contrast to Canada, South Africa’s competition law has both competition and public interest objectives. A major focus of the legislation from a public interest perspective is the promotion of historically disadvantaged persons and small business. This is understandable, given the fact that when the legislation was first enacted in 1998, South Africa was emerging
Following its recent announcement of a proposed market inquiry in this sector, the South African Competition Commission (the “Commission”) is continuing its efforts to improve regulatory scrutiny within digital markets. On 7 May 2021, the Commission published for comments draft amendments to its guidelines for the notification of small mergers (the “Draft
Non-compete clauses are included in virtually all purchase and sale agreements. They are designed to ensure that purchasers realize the full value of the acquired business by, for example, prohibiting competition from vendors within a defined area for a certain amount of time.[1] There is no question that such clauses are valuable to purchasers and essential in the mergers and acquisition context.
The Canadian Competition Bureau (the “Bureau”) has long recognized that non-compete clauses “can serve legitimate purposes”. However, the Bureau’s approach to non-compete clauses has been revised in its updated Competitor Collaboration Guidelines (the “CCGs”), which were issued on May 6, 2021 – see our prior blog post titled “New Competitor Collaboration Guidelines”. Significantly, as discussed in more detail below, the Bureau has signalled that it may consider such clauses under the criminal cartel provisions in the Competition Act (the “Act”) where they, for example, amount to a market allocation agreement or there is evidence that they are nothing more than a “sham”.
Continue Reading Non-Compete Clauses – So What’s the Risk?
On May 6, 2021, the Competition Bureau (the “Bureau”) released its new (and long-awaited) competitor collaboration guidelines (the “New CCGs”). This is the first update to these guidelines since the previous version was published by the Bureau over a decade ago, in 2009 (the “2009 CCGs”).
The New CCGs
On April 1, 2021, the Government of Canada announced two important updates relating to merger filing fees: (i) a decreased merger filing fee ($74,905.57), and (ii) a new Service Fees Remission Policy.
Decreased Merger Filing Fee for 2021
Effective immediately, the Competition Bureau’s (the “Bureau”) filing fee for merger reviews has decreased from
Canada’s Competition Bureau (the “Bureau”) has joined an international multilateral working group that will be focusing on the analysis of pharmaceutical mergers. Initiated by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, the working group also includes the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, Offices of State Attorneys General, the U.K. Competition and Markets Authority (“CMA”)
