This article was first published in Competition Policy International – Antitrust Chronicle on September 3, 2024; for further in-depth analysis, please visit the Antitrust Chronicle®

I. Introduction

Canada has embarked on a transformative journey to fortify its competition policy landscape, hopefully ushering in a new era of regulatory vigor and market fairness. The recent amendments to the Competition Act mark a significant milestone in Canada’s commitment to fostering a competitive marketplace that benefits consumers and businesses alike. Led by the efforts of policymakers, the Competition Bureau, and competition advocates, these reforms aim to address anti-competitive practices, enhance enforcement mechanisms, and promote a culture of fair competition.

The amendments to the Competition Act represent a comprehensive overhaul of Canada’s competition law framework, targeting key areas such as anti-competitive mergers, abuses of market power, harmful competitor collaboration and deceptive business practices. By empowering the Competition Bureau with enhanced enforcement tools and enabling private access to the Competition Tribunal to recover derived benefits from market power abuses, these reforms seek to create a more level playing field for businesses while safeguarding consumer interests.

However, amidst the commendable strides towards strengthening competition policy, criticisms have surfaced regarding the process and design of the legislative changes. As discussed below, concerns have been raised about the use of a legislative process that has limited careful consideration of the specific language and impact of these amendments. Other criticisms include the entrenchment of merger control thresholds in statutory form (as opposed to being in enforcement guidelines as is the case with the U.S.), the revised criteria for abuse of dominance, and the breadth of the criminalization of wage-fixing and no-poach agreements. These critiques underscore the need for a nuanced approach to policy reform that balances enforcement effectiveness with regulatory clarity and consistency.

In his recent op-ed, Commissioner of Competition Matthew Boswell emphasized the importance of not only robust enforcement of the Competition Act, but also an overall regulatory environment that fosters competition and innovation. He highlighted the need to address outdated barriers to competition, both within Canada and across provincial borders, to unleash the full potential of a dynamic and competitive marketplace. This call to action underscores the interconnectedness of regulatory frameworks, public policies, and market dynamics in shaping a conducive environment for healthy competition.

Looking ahead, Canada faces the imperative of addressing regulatory frameworks that impede competition and productivity, including interprovincial barriers, foreign investment restrictions, and public procurement impediments. By aligning governance practices with OECD best practices, embedding competition principles in broader public policies, and promoting competitive neutrality in markets with state aid support, Canada can pave the way for a more vibrant and competitive economy.

As Canada maneuvers through the dynamics of modern competition policy, it is recommended that policymakers pause on Competition Act reform for the time being and gauge the impact and effectiveness of the amendments to date. The new focus should be on making Canada’s regulatory environment more conducive to competitive markets. By fostering a culture of fair competition, promoting innovation, and dismantling barriers to market entry, Canada can make significant strides towards improving its international competitiveness and productivity.

II. Recent Legislative Changes to the Competition Act

Beginning in 2022, significant amendments were made to the Competition Act in three waves:

  • On June 23, 2022, Bill C-19 (Budget Implementation Act, 2022, No.1) (the “BIA”), received royal assent;
  • On December 15, 2023, Bill C-56 (An Act to amend the Excise Tax Act and the Competition Act) (“Bill C-56”) received royal assent; and
  • On June 20, 2024, Bill C-59 (An Act to implement certain provisions of the fall economic statement tabled in Parliament on November 21, 2023 and certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on March 28, 2023) (“Bill C-59,” together with the BIA and Bill C-56, the “Amendments”) received royal assent.

Currently, all the Amendments are in force, with the exception of certain provisions relating to the competitor collaboration provisions included in Bill C-56 (which will come into force on December 15, 2024) and the provisions of Bill C-59 relating to private rights of access (which will come into force on June 20, 2025). The Amendments are comprehensive and impact many fundamental aspects of the Competition Act, including, but not limited to, those discussed below.

A. Competitor Collaboration and Conspiracy Provisions

Most notably, the Amendments introduced criminal provisions prohibiting wage-fixing and no-poach agreements among unaffiliated employers (BIA) and repealed the efficiencies defense with respect to the civil competitor collaboration provisions (Bill C-56).

The Amendments expanded s. 90.1 of the Competition Act (civil competitor collaboration) to include agreements between non-competitors in certain instances (Bill C-56)[1] and to also extend to past conduct (Bill C-59). The Amendments also expanded remedies available under s. 90.1 to include administrative monetary penalties (“AMPs”), among others (Bill C-59).

The Amendments also created an “environmental collaboration” exemption which can exempt a collaboration from the application of the criminal conspiracy provisions and the civil collaboration provisions of the Act where the Competition Bureau issues a certificate on application by the parties (Bill C-59).

B. Abuse of Dominance

The Amendments made significant changes to the test for “abuse of dominance” under s. 79 of the Act, including:

  • Expansion of the definition of an anti-competitive act from any act intended to have a predatory, exclusionary or disciplinary negative effect on a competitor to also include an act intended to have an adverse effect on competition (BIA).
  • Revision of the elements of abuse of dominance such that only (a) substantial market power and either (b) a practice of anti-competitive acts or (c) a substantially lessening or prevention of competition are required to be proven (Bill C-56). (Previously, all three elements were required). That said, under the Amendments, only a prohibition order is available where only two elements are shown. Further remedies, including AMPS, still require all three elements to be proven (Bill C-56).

C. Refusal to Deal

The Amendments expanded the existing refusal to deal provisions of the Competition Act to include the right to be supplied with the means of diagnosis and repair (‘right to repair’) (Bill C-59). The Amendments also included revisions to the existing refusal to deal test, such that a person is no longer required to be substantially affected in its entire business and is instead only required to be substantially affected in whole or part of its business (Bill C-59).

D. Deceptive Marketing

The Amendments introduced new environmental representation provisions prohibiting:

  • performance claims regarding a product’s or service’s benefits for protecting or restoring the environment or mitigating the environmental, social and ecological causes or effects of climate change without adequate and proper testing (Bill C-59).
  • performance claims regarding the benefits of a business or business activity for protecting or restoring the environment or mitigating the environmental and ecological causes or effects of climate change without adequate and proper substantiation in accordance with internationally recognized methodology (Bill C-59).

E. Mergers

Most notably, the Amendments repealed the efficiencies defense for mergers (Bill C-56) and introduced structural presumptions (Bill C-59). Specifically, following the Amendments, there is now a presumption that a merger will result in a substantial prevention or lessening of competition (“SLPC”) where the merger leads to an HHI increase of greater than 100 and either (a) a combined post-merger market share of greater than percent 30, or (b) a post-merger HHI of greater than 1,800. If demonstrated, the onus will shift to the merging parties to rebut the presumption of anticompetitive effects (i.e. to prove there is no SLPC).

The Amendments revised the remedial standard for mergers such that, where the Tribunal finds that a merger will result in an SLPC, the required remedy is to restore competition to the level that would have prevailed but for the merger, rather than simply ensuring that any lessening or prevention of competition is not substantial (Bill C-59). The Amendments also included various procedural changes to the merger notification provisions of the Competition Act (Bill C-59).

F. Private Rights of Access[2]

Enforcement of the civil provisions of the Act is primarily done by the Commissioner of Competition. Prior to the Amendments, private actors could only seek leave to bring a matter before the Competition Tribunal with respect to refusal to deal, price maintenance, exclusive dealing, tied selling and market restrictions. This was expanded to include abuse of dominance (BIA) as well as deceptive marketing (Bill C-59) and civil competitor collaboration (Bill C-59).

The Amendments also modified the test for leave which must be met before a private party can bring an application before the Competition Tribunal to make it an easier threshold to meet in most cases (Bill C-59). Finally, the Amendments also introduced the ability for a plaintiff and other persons affected by the conduct to receive monetary compensation (not to exceed the value of the benefit derived from the conduct that is the subject of the order) if the application is successful before the Competition Tribunal (Bill C-59).

G. Market Studies

The Amendments created the ability for the Commissioner of Competition or the Minister to initiate a market study under the Competition Act (Bill C-56). Notably, under the new market study provisions, the Commissioner may apply to a court for an order compelling the production of records, an oral examination under oath or a written responses to questions under oath (a s. 11 order) from third parties, regardless of whether there is any allegation of wrongdoing on the part of such parties.

III. Criticisms of the Amendments

There has been extensive discussion among stakeholders regarding the Amendments, including significant commentary raising criticisms of both the process used to implement the Amendments as well as the substantive content of the Amendments.

Regarding process, it is notable that the first wave of amendments was introduced pursuant to a budget implementation act: an omnibus bill involving little to no debate. In general, the Amendments were introduced and passed relatively quickly, with little substantive study conducted to evaluate their impacts, and appeared to be largely reacting to current political trends and public pressure. With respect to Bill C-59, arguably the most substantive of the bills and containing the most fundamental changes, few experts were invited to speak at parliamentary committee meetings, and the opinions of many stakeholders in the private sector appeared to be largely overlooked.

Substantively, the amendment process was a fractured and piece meal process, showing little consideration for the broader regime created by the Competition Act as a whole, the fundamental basis of competition law (which is traditionally grounded in economically rigorous theories of harm) and no serious consideration of the overall institutional design of the Competition Bureau or the Competition Tribunal, or the limits thereof.[3]

Generally, the Amendments signal a move in the direction of narrower and more codified competition laws which risk becoming unnecessarily complex, as contrasted to the purpose driven rules of general application which have historically been the approach of competition laws in Canada.

For instance, the structural presumptions which have been introduced by the Amendments are a clear divergence from the previous principles-based approach to merger analysis. More troublesome, the thresholds chosen for these new structural presumptions simply replicate the thresholds used in the merger enforcement guidelines in the United States and it does not appear that any independent study was conducted to ensure that such thresholds are fit for purpose in Canada. These thresholds do not reflect the unique context of the Canadian economy (which differs drastically from the United States economy) and accordingly it cannot be presumed that these specific thresholds are the best thresholds to use to achieve the aims of the Competition Act in Canada (or that they will support the aims of the Competition Act at all). It also bears noting that even in the United States, where structural presumptions are used the thresholds are contained in guidelines, which can easily be amended to adapt to market dynamics and the changing economy, and are not contained in legislation, which is significantly more static.

Moreover, the changes to the remedial standard used in merger review (discussed above) are overreaching, punitive and override decades of Supreme Court jurisprudence. These amendments not only fail to reflect economic realities (most mergers will inevitably lead to some lessening or prevention of competition, albeit minor) but also threaten to harm incentives for pro-competitive mergers. Amendments to the abuse of dominance test which remove the need to demonstrate anti-competitive effects and the extension of the civil competitor collaboration provisions to non-competitors may similarly result in over enforcement at the expense of efficient or pro-competitive business conduct.

Notably, the Amendments to the Act are also out of step with various international counterparties. Most prominently, the introduction of new criminal prohibitions against wage-fixing and no-poach agreements has made Canada an international outlier. While the United States has adopted an enforcement approach which seeks to bring criminal actions against such conduct (which has been met with limited success before the courts), no other jurisdiction has criminalized this type of conduct. Moreover, even measured against the enforcement position in the United States, Canada’s statutory prohibitions in relation to wage fixing and no-poach agreements go well beyond what would be prosecuted by antitrust agencies in the United States.

Other substantive concerns regarding the Amendments include a lack of clarity in the new provisions, including, for instance, in the new private access regime and the new requirements for substantiation of environmental claims under the deceptive marketing provisions.

In this context, it would be advisable for Canadian policy makers to hit “pause” on further legislative amendments and take the time to assess the impact and effectiveness of the Amendments based on actual enforcement. In the meantime, time can be spent examining Canada’s overall regulatory environment, which can have anti-competitive and market distorting effects.

IV. The need to shift competition policy reform to address Canada’s stifling regulatory environment

According to the OECD, pro-competition regulations are essential to nurture innovation, business dynamism, productivity, investment and employment in an economy. In the recent OECD report on economy-wide indicators measuring the distortions to competition that can be induced by firms and by the involvement of governments, Canada ranks below the OECD average.[4] The OECD Product Market Regulation report of July, 2024 makes the following recommendation to the Canadian government:

To make the country’s regulatory framework more conducive to competition, Canada could better align the governance of state-owned enterprises and the public procurement framework to OECD best practices. Additionally, the country could address its high barriers to foreign direct investment and reduce the administrative and regulatory burden imposed on businesses.[5]

A. Interprovincial Trade Barriers

There exist significant barriers to interprovincial trade in Canada despite various attempts over the years to reduce them, including by such initiatives as the 2017 Canadian Free Trade Agreement.[6]These barriers are especially acute in relation to procurement, labor mobility, trucking, and agriculture and agrifood markets. There is less free movement of goods and services within Canada than either the United States or the European Union, both of which have significantly more internal sub-divisions and larger populations.[7]

Canada’s internal trade obstacles have historical and administrative origins. Regardless of the stated purpose for erecting interprovincial trade barriers, the primary effect is to protect the home provincial market. A reduction in the number of competitors allows suppliers within the province to charge higher prices and to reduce productivity. As for provincial procurement, biased government purchasing means local construction firms and suppliers are often favored on infrastructure projects, even where they are higher cost than out-of-provinces firms. Provincial monopolies over the wholesale distribution of alcohol ultimately result in higher prices, and less choices for consumers. They also lead to biased procurement and marketing decisions in favor of local breweries and wineries. Another common form of interprovincial trade barrier is found in professional labor certification and licensing affecting a wide variety of professions.

For example, professions such as social work, nursing, denturists, land surveying, legal services and some skilled trades find their qualifications are not recognized in all provinces and therefore their ability to move around the country and practice their profession are restricted.[8] Any differences in certification laws between provinces can have the effect of limiting workers mobility inadvertently creating a monopoly effect for these professional services in the province. Canada’s trucking sector faces significance internal regulatory barriers. For example, certain types of trucks axles must be driven at night in one province but only during the day in a neighboring province. Another source of inefficiency flows from the differences in regulations governing what truck tires can be used across the various provinces. In agriculture, there are additional inspection and labelling requirements to ship certain food products between provinces, and provincial marketing boards for certain products subject to supply management that impedes free trade between provinces.[9]

Recent studies demonstrate that internal trade barriers add between 7 to 14.5 percent to product prices in Canada.[10] More generally, Canada has a problem with a growing regulatory burden for business which Statistics Canada reports have risen by 40 percent from 2006 to 2021.[11] According to the experts who have worked on overcoming these challenges, an interprovincial barrier reduction strategy requires simplifying procedures, aligning regulations, and creating national regulatory entities. Though difficult, a plan to focus on industries and offering government incentives could pave the way for greater progress. The federal government claims to have been making some progress in reducing its internal regulatory barriers but at the same time acknowledges there is much work to do.[12] By better tackling these interprovincial barriers and unnecessarily burdensome regulations on business,[13] Canada can enhance its economic performance and foster a more effective and competitive business landscape. Achieving this goal, however, requires cooperation among federal, provincial, and territorial authorities, alongside active engagement from the private sector to eliminate regulatory hurdles.[14]

B. Restrictions on Foreign Investment

Over the past 50 years, the world has enjoyed unprecedented economic growth and prosperity owing in measure to facilitate and enhance world trade and flows of capital. In the context of globalization, a free flow of capital allows for the efficient allocation of productive resources and attracting foreign direct investment (“FDI”) brings domestic economies much needed capital. Foreign investments can create jobs, spur innovation and help build infrastructure, among other things. Balanced against such benefits of FDI, however, there may be other valid policy considerations, such as economic or national security concerns, especially during periods of heightened geopolitical tensions, regional conflicts and national emergencies such as a global pandemic. Canada’s current regime for reviewing foreign investments is under the Investment Canada Act[15] (“ICA”), which provides for the review of investments exceeding certain thresholds to ensure that they are of “net benefit” to Canada and/or address potential national security concerns.

“Net benefit to Canada” and national security determinations under the ICA are essentially political in nature, made by the applicable minister or Cabinet. Notwithstanding that the ICA sets out the factors to be considered in determining “net benefit to Canada” the Minister of Innovation, Science and Economic Development issued a statement recently indicating that when it comes to net benefit reviews involving Canadian head-quartered companies in the critical mineral sector, a determination of “net benefit to Canada” would only be made in the most exceptional of circumstances. The political nature of these decisions carries the risk of the ICA being used as a protectionist tool to shelter domestic companies from international market forces and competition.

Canada has made significant efforts to increase its attractiveness as an investment destination. However, as a relatively small economy reliant upon FDI for capital intensive sectors such as energy and natural resource industries, Canada can do better balancing the inflow of foreign investment while protecting our national economic security. Procedural deficiencies including the lack of transparency and protectionist policies can chill foreign investors who shy away from uncertainty and frustrate those caught up in the “black-box” of hidden investment barriers. Some commentators have proposed substantive reform to the highly discretionary ICA process that would take inspiration from the merger review procedure under the Competition Act with a foundation based on economic analysis and decision-making by an expert tribunal.[16]

In addition to screening and approval processes under the ICA, there are a significant number of foreign trade and investment barriers which continue to harm trade and competition in our domestic markets. These barriers include sector specific restrictions related to fishing, mining, energy, air transport, telecommunications, certain supply-managed tariffs in agricultural products and cultural activities. Ownership restrictions within these sectors were established to address particular policy objectives and have undergone varying degrees of regulatory and policy changes. These sectors are heavily influenced by technological change and globalization. Notwithstanding current protectionist outbreaks, “the long-term trend internationally has been to liberalize market access by various means, including reducing restrictions on foreign ownership. Other countries have realized substantial economic benefits where greater market access has led to increased competition, innovation and investment and has attracted new talent,”[17]

C. Public Procurement

Public procurement is another old chestnut associated with restraining trade and distorting the competitive process. Public procurement authorities often prefer local suppliers over foreign providers in procurement contracts to achieve socioeconomic objectives (e.g., promoting “sustainable” local businesses, and the development of small and medium local enterprises). Buy-national provisions are prime examples of measures that explicitly exclude foreign firms from government contracts. Canada maintains far more extensive open procurement commitments at the WTO and in trade agreements than most countries. The recent “Buy America” policy, for example, which discriminates public procurement in favor of American domestic suppliers is a widespread global practice. Canada may soon follow suit with a reciprocal procurement policy for foreign suppliers. Although Canada receives high marks for its open public procurement policy with international suppliers, according to the OECD, the regulatory framework for public procurement in Canada “does not provide a level playing field for all potential bidders.”[18] Many small and medium enterprises (“SMEs”) do not consider the federal government as a contracting opportunity.[19] Competition is generally understood as the optimal means to obtain best value for money in public procurement. Sole-sourcing or preferred vendor sourcing restrict competition as it involves direct government purchases from one or a select few suppliers.

Canada’s procurement, which makes up about 15 percent of GDP, includes a complex web of preferred vendor contracts often limited to businesses that are able to navigate the complexities of RFPs and grant applications. Significant amounts of red tape[20] appear to shut out smaller, more innovative technology companies in the health tech and cybersecurity sectors from federal procurement contracts. A House of Commons Committee has observed that “federal procurement is disjointed and would benefit from better coordination among federal departments and agencies.”[21] There is widespread acknowledgement that the federal procurement process needs to be simplified for SMEs, which would encourage greater competition and provide better value for Canadian citizens.

D. State-Owned Monopolies

Adding to the list of barriers to competition in Canada are state-owned monopolies. For instance, most provincial governments operate their own alcohol retail services protected from private businesses and competition. The domestic mail delivery market is monopolized by Canada Post, a federal crown corporation. Other key sectors such as energy distribution and urban transit are also shielded by government from competition. State owned-enterprises (“SOEs”) are common internationally and may pursue strategic goals other than profit maximization. For example, SOEs may be required to provide public goods (e.g. electricity and natural gas), increase employment, provide affordable services and limit private or foreign control of a national economy. The competition concerns arise where SOEs continue operating in markets where its public interest goals are no longer evident, and where the product markets could be more efficiently served by private enterprise. The concept of competitive neutrality fosters competition by eliminating or reducing undue competitive advantages that some players may enjoy over their competitors, such as support granted by the state or regulations that favor incumbents. The OECD encourages governments to ensure a level playing field between state-owned and privately-owned enterprises, between different privately-owned enterprises and between domestic and foreign enterprises. A level playing field is necessary for competition to work properly and deliver benefits to consumers and the wider economy.[22]

V. A Holistic Approach to Competition Policy

In a recent study[23] it was estimated that up to 35 percent of the Canadian economy is protected from competition to some degree. It should come as no surprise that a former Commissioner of Competition suggested that public restraints to competition can do much more harm to the economy than private restraints.[24] The current Commissioner of Competition, in a recent speech, made a call to arms for a “whole-of government approach” where all levels of government design their regulations and policies to maximize the benefits of competition, referencing similar successful pro-competition policy reforms in Australia and the United States.[25]

Australia found its economy suffering in the early 1990’s under the weight of heavy regulation and ineffective competition policy. As a result, the Government of Australia undertook a broad review of the country’s economic and competition policies by a panel led by Professor Himler. The study determined that the country’s competitiveness was not prioritized sufficiently in policy-making, and in response, the Australian National Competition Council was established in 1995, under an agreement among the federal, state and municipal governments. The council found that coordinated action was needed if Australia was to address its economic challenges. This dedicated competition advocacy institution fostered market integration in a federal state, eliminated special rules and exemptions that blunt the impact of competition and promoted greater adherence to competition values in regulatory decision making.[26] For example, a Himler report recommendation, which was subsequently adopted, was that the exemption from competition laws that then applied to government businesses should be removed, and that competition law should extend to additional sectors of the economy, such as professions, not then covered by the law. As a result of implementing the Himler panel’s initiatives, Australia estimated its economy grew by approximately AUS $8 billion each year.[27]

In the United States, President Biden signed an executive order in 2021 “to promote competition in the American economy, which will lower prices for families, increase wages for workers, and promote innovation and even faster economic growth.” The order established a “whole-of-government effort to promote competition in the American economy” and created a White House Competition Council (“Council”). The executive order appointed fourteen federal agencies to the Council. These agencies are tasked with implementing the executive order by identifying areas where regulations stifle competition and, mainly through new guidelines and rulemaking activity, working to eliminate government-created barriers to competition. The Council target areas include: (i) competition in healthcare: “lowering prescription drug and healthcare costs for consumers.” (ii) competition in labor markets: “empowering workers to demand dignity and respect in the workplace.” (iii) competition in finance: “lowering costs and increasing market transparency for consumers and businesses” (iv) competition in food and agriculture: “lowering food prices for consumers and increasing earnings for farmers and ranchers” (v) competition in technology: “lower prices and better options for broadband, devices, and other services.” and (vi) competition in transportation:  “lowering prices for travellers and reducing shipping costs for businesses.”[28] Some positive results from Biden’s executive order on competition include lower prices for air travel, bank overdraft fees, inhalers, insulin, turkeys and pork.[29]

Significant attention has been paid to Canadian’s competition policy over the past three years with much of the focus on amendments to the Competition Act to deal with private restraints of trade. With the exception of returning market study powers to the Competition Bureau to better promote competition with all levels of government, little has been done on the competition policy front to tackle public restraints to competition. The Commissioner of Competition is sounding the alarm that Canada will not be able to make meaningfully improvements to its falling competitive intensity and declining productivity problem[30] without tackling government-made barriers to trade, both internal and external. The Competition Bureau now has more than sufficient firepower to take enforcement action against anti-competitive conduct by private firms. There is no need for further tinkering with these enforcement tools for the time being. Rather, the federal government should heed the 2008 advice of the Competition Policy Review Panel[31] and others,[32] follow the lead of Australia and the United States, and create a Competitiveness Council in Canada which would strongly advocate for pro-competition policies, smarter regulations and help build a government-wide competition culture to boost Canada’s lagging competitiveness and productivity.

[1] This amendment will not come into force until December 15, 2024.

[2] The amendments to the private right of access regime will come into force on June 20, 2025.

[3] For further discussion see: Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, The Future of Competition Policy in Canada (2022), online at: https://ised-isde.canada.ca/site/strategic-policy-sector/sites/default/files/attachments/2022/The-Future-of-Competition-Policy-eng_0.pdf

[4] OECD, 2018 Product Market Regulation, OECD Product Market Regulation (PMR) indicators: How does Canada compare? (6 March 2020), available online at: https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/topics/policy-sub-issues/product-market-regulation/Canada_PMR%20country%20note.pdf

[5] OECD, Product Market Regulation Report (July 2024), available online at: https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/sub-issues/product-market-regulation.html

[6] Canadian Free Trade Agreement (2017), available online at: https://www.cfta-alec.ca

[7] The Hub, Fen Osler Hampson and Tim Sargent: Interprovincial trade barriers are seriously stunting Canada’s growth (23 May 2024), available online at: https://thehub.ca/2024/05/23/fen-osler-hampson-and-tim-sargent-interprovincial-trade-barriers-are-stunting-canadas-growth/

[8] Business Council of Alberta, Money on the table: why removing Canada’s internal trade barriers can improve our competitiveness (10 November 2021), available online at: https://businesscouncilab.com/insights-category/analysis/money-on-the-table/

[9] Fraser Institute, Towards a More Productive and United Canada: the Case for Liberalizing Interprovincial Trade (12 November 2020), available online at:https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/towards-a-more-productive-and-united-canada-4day-week-essay.pdf

[10] Fraser Institute, Towards a More Productive and United Canada: the Case for Liberalizing Interprovincial Trade (12 November 2020), available online at:https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/towards-a-more-productive-and-united-canada-4day-week-essay.pdf at pages 2-3.

[11] Statistics Canada, Research Insights: Challenges and Opportunities in Innovation, Technology Adoption and Productivity (24 July 2024), available online at:https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/11-631-x/11-631-x2024005-eng.htm

[12] Government of Canada, Intergovernmental Affairs, The Government of Canada is making it easier to trade within Canada (23 July 2024), available online at: https://www.canada.ca/en/intergovernmental-affairs/news/2024/07/the-government-of-canada-is-making-it-easier-to-trade-within-canada.html

[13] Policy Options, When Canadian regulations favour corporate concentration (15 July 2024), available online at: https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/july-2024/regulations-favour-corporate-concentration/

[14] Laurier Centre for the Study of Canada, Chancellors’ Challenge: Interprovincial Trade Barriers (14 March 2024), available online at: https://studyofcanada.ca/chancellors-challenge-interprovincial-trade-barriers/#:~:text=Other%20Types%20of%20Prohibitive%20Trade%20Barriers&text=This%20can%20create%20compliance%20costs,differences%20in%20each%20province’s%20regulations

[15] Investment Canada Act (Canada), available online at: https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/i-21.8/index.html

[16] Grant Bishop, A Rule of Reason for Inward FDI: Integrating Canadian Foreign Investment Review and Competition Policy, University of Calgary School of Public Policy SPP Research Papers, Volume 9 Issue 34 (October 2016), available online at: https://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Foreign-Investment-Bishop-Final.pdf

[17] Competition Bureau of Canada, Compete to Win: Final Report (June 2008), available online at: https://competition-bureau.canada.ca/how-we-foster-competition/education-and-outreach/publications/compete-win-final-report-june-2008

[18] OECD, 2018 Product Market Regulation, OECD Product Market Regulation (PMR) Indicators: How does Canada Compare?, available online at: https://issuu.com/oecd.publishing/docs/can_country_note_-_tot_final

[19] House of Commons Canada, Report of the Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates, Modernizing Federal Procurement for Small and Medium Enterprises, Women-Owned and Indigenous Businesses (June 2018), available online at: https://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/OGGO/Reports/RP9996115/oggorp15/oggorp15-e.pdf

[20] City News, Tech industry says barriers keep Canadian companies from selling to government (3 April 2024), available online at: https://kitchener.citynews.ca/2024/04/03/tech-industry-says-barriers-keep-canadian-companies-from-selling-to-government/

[21] House of Commons Canada, Report of the Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates, Modernizing Federal Procurement for Small and Medium Enterprises, Women-Owned and Indigenous Businesses (June 2018), available online at: https://www.ourcommons.ca/Content/Committee/421/OGGO/Reports/RP9996115/oggorp15/oggorp15-e.pdf

[22] OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Competitive Neutrality (30 May 2021), available online at: https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/sub-issues/competitive-and-fair-markets/competitive-neutrality-in-competition-policy.html

[23] Vincent Geloso, Walled from Competition: Measuring Protected Industries in Canada, Fraser Institute(May 2019), available online at:https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/walled-from-competition-measuring-protected-industries-in-canada.pdf

[24] John Pecman, Unleash Canada’s Competition Watchdog: Improving the Effectiveness of Canada’s Competition Bureau (2018), Canadian Competition Law Review, Volume 31 No. 1 (2018).

[25] Competition Bureau of Canada, Matthew Boswell, A whole-of-government approach to promoting competition (5 October 2023), remarks as prepared for delivery available online at: https://www.canada.ca/en/competition-bureau/news/2023/10/a-whole-of-government-approach-to-promoting-competition.html

[26] Competition Bureau of Canada, Compete to Win: Final Report (June 2008), available online at: https://competition-bureau.canada.ca/how-we-foster-competition/education-and-outreach/publications/compete-win-final-report-june-2008 at pages 96-97.

[27] Russell Miller, “On the Road to Improved Social and Economic Welfare: The Contribution to Australian Competition and Consumer Law and Policy Law Reform” in Ron Levy et al, eds, New Directions for Law in Australia: Essays in Contemporary Law Reform (Canberra: ANU Press, 2017) at page 39.

[28] White House Presidential Action, Joseph Biden, Executive Order on Promoting Competition in the American Economy (9 July 2021), available online at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/07/09/executive-order-on-promoting-competition-in-the-american-economy/

[29] American Economic Liberties Project, The State of the Biden Administration’s Competition Agenda (1 March 2024), available online at: https://www.economicliberties.us/our-work/the-state-of-the-biden-administrations-competition-agenda/

[30] Competition Bureau of Canada, News Release, Competition Bureau report finds Canada’s competitive intensity in decline (19 October 2023), available online at: https://www.canada.ca/en/competition-bureau/news/2023/10/competition-bureau-report-finds-canadas-competitive-intensity-in-decline.html#

[31] Competition Bureau of Canada, Compete to Win: Final Report (June 2008), available online at: https://competition-bureau.canada.ca/how-we-foster-competition/education-and-outreach/publications/compete-win-final-report-june-2008 at page 102.

[32] John Pecman, Toughening Canada’s Competitiveness, Canadian Chamber Future of Business Centre (November 2022), available online at: https://chamber.ca/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Toughening-Canadas-Competitiveness-EN.pdf at page 13.